As political leaders here hammer out the details of the next government, it is becoming increasingly clear that the makeup of the next cabinet is linked to events beyond Lebanon’s borders, namely the talks underway between Saudi Arabia and Syria, which may culminate this Saturday with a visit by Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz to Damascus.

Indeed, Lebanon’s cabinet is one of the main topics on the agenda of the Saudi-Syrian summit, which comes in the wake of a number of meetings between representatives of the two countries.

While the summit may result in a push for consensus among Lebanon’s various rival parties and the speedy formation of a new cabinet, one can be sure the Syrian regime will not acquiesce to such an outcome, unless it receives something in return.

Hints that such a quid pro quo is in the works were apparent on Tuesday, when the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar reported that Syrian President Bashar Assad told Saudi delegates that Syria had not interfered in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections and would remain uninvolved with regard to the cabinet.

Whatever Syria was promised in return for maintaining such an uncharacteristically detached posture, it seems that the party that stands the most to lose in such a deal is Hezbollah.

Not only did Hezbollah lose the parliamentary elections after promising  supporters another “divine victory,”  but it has been forced to contend with an Iranian regime that’s been shaken by weeks of protest.

In light of the Iranian crisis, and the possibility that Iran will have to alter its policies no matter who is President, Hezbollah is likely more determined that ever to secure itself institutionally and obtain veto power—which requires 11 of Lebanon’s 30 ministerial portfolios— over Lebanon’s next government.

In their meeting last week, Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah told Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri that veto power was a requisite for any real partnership in the government. March 14 politicians, on the other hand, see the veto-power gambit as an attempt to undermine the verdict of the elections.

They have history and the constitution on their side: The simple rule of the democratic system designed by the Taif accord is that the majority should govern. 

The struggle over veto power, or ‘the obstructing third’ may well come to define the coming period of Lebanese politics as Hariri holds discussions  over the composition of the next government.

That struggle is particularly dangerous, as the longer the country is without a government,  the  greater the chances of violent eruptions, like the Sunday clashes in Aisha Bakkar, which called to mind the bloody events of May 7, 2008, and raised concerns about the degree to which the opposition is willing to facilitate Hariri’s mission to form a government,

Earlier signs of Hezbollah’s resolve to rebuff the election results were apparent in Nasrallah’s first post-election address, when he reassured supporters that Hezbollah had obtained a popular majority, despite its failure to acquire a parliamentary one. In addition, Hezbollah proved to the  Lebanese people on that  “glorious” day in May 2008, that the Party of God is willing to employ violence to obstruct the decisions of the democratically elected government.

Thus, whatever the makeup of the next cabinet, the opposition  will retain de facto veto power. Even so, giving March 8 the formal power of the obstructing third only increases the ability of Hezbollah to hinder whatever legislation it takes issue with, given the political price the opposition paid for employing violence on May 7. 

How to solve the dilemma and move on?

One of the proposed solutions is to give President Michel Sleiman the “voice of balance”  by allowing him to chose five ministers. In such a scenario, March 14 would get 15 cabinet positions and the opposition ten, meaning no side, per say, would be able to rule or obstruct.

Despite Sleiman’s recent objections to the constitutionality of opposition veto power, giving the president ministries still diminishes the majority’s ability to govern and puts the President in a position where he will be open to criticism and attacks if his bloc ever actually exercises its power.

Another risk in the 15-10-5 solution is that Hezbollah is asking for guarantees, were it to give up  veto power as a result of the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement. These guarantees might mean anything, but it is apparent now that the party wants two of the President’s ministers to be “close” to the opposition, which would raise questions as to whether these ministers would side with the President or March 8 when it comes to critical decisions.

Further complicating matters are the oppositions’ Christian figures. While Marada party chief and MP Sleiman Franjieh has repeatedly demanded that the opposition be given the obstructing third, March 8’s principal Christian leader, MP Michel Aoun,  is currently making a nakedly unconstitutional and unheard of request to have the cabinet divided according to the makeup of parliament, meaning Aoun’s Change and Reform bloc  would get seven ministries.

Apparently Hezbollah, while waiting for regional dynamics to take shape, does not have to utter the phrase “veto power;” that job is reserved for the Party of God’s Christian allies. Hezbollah, equipped with arms and the popular majority, can play the wait-and-see game.

Some analysts say Syria may indeed refrain from meddling, but only in return for  assurances that the regime will be given immunity from the International Tribunal . Others say the regime doesn’t even have to interfere—its proxies in Lebanon can handle the task just fine.

In either case, how the formation of the cabinet plays out will be a good indication of the future role Syria intends to play in Lebanon.

What is clear now, however, is that Hezbollah, having just watched their Iranian patrons brought low by mass protests and bloody repression, is more determined that ever to keep their weapons. The party knows well its guns are more valuable than any ministry.

While it is yet to be seen whether the opposition will accept a partnership that doesn’t include veto power, it is likely the next big question, once the cabinet is formed, will concern what the Ministerial Statement says about Hezbollah’s arms.

Whatever the ultimate wording of the statement, it is obvious the Lebanese electorate has already answered the question. They did so on election day, turning out in enormous numbers and giving victory to the side that advocated building a strong state, one that can actually govern, rather than fritter away its time scrambling to put out fires caused by regional and local conflicts.