I couldn’t help but detect an element of commonality in two recent news items. Farouq Qaddoumi, who heads the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s Political Department and is someone long considered close to the Syrian regime, accused Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas of having helped assassinate Yasser Arafat; and Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

The common denominator in both stories is that they illustrate the extent to which Syria has been frantically seeking to maintain the appearance that it is a major regional player. For the longest time, Syria has tried to convince the world, and particularly the United States, that nothing could be done in Lebanon, Iraq or Palestine without Syrian help. However, all the signs are that Syria’s regional relevance is on the decline, so that at a time when the Obama administration is re-engaging Damascus, the reality is that the Assad regime comes to the table with a weak hand.

First came the Qaddoumi accusation, on Qatar’s Al-Jazeera, that Abbas, along with former Palestinian security chief Muhammad Dahlan, had conspired with former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to murder Arafat. Qaddoumi made his statement two weeks before the scheduled Fatah congress in early July. This may have reflected an internal power struggle within Fatah, as differences between Abbas and others boil to the surface. That was the analysis offered by the Damascus-based Palestinian commentator Ali Badwan, who also predicted that Qaddoumi’s “bombshell” would have lasting repercussions inside Fatah.

So far, Qaddoumi’s claim has been rightly ridiculed in major Arab papers, except by commentators close to the Syrian regime. However, Qaddoumi’s closeness to Damascus strongly suggests that his statement is part of a Syrian gambit to shape Palestinian affairs. The Assad regime’s declared policy has been to alter the PLO’s structure by pushing for Hamas to be integrated into the organization. In this way, Syria has sought to terminate Fatah’s domination of the PLO, the official representative of the Palestinian people, and strengthen its ally Hamas, whose leaders reside in Damascus. Hamas could then take over the PLO’s leadership.

Assad’s calculation is that once Hamas gains broader legitimacy, Syria would become the primary interlocutor with Washington (and with Israel) on Palestinian affairs. It is for this reason that Bashar Assad has been frantically urging European delegations to meet with Hamas officials in Damascus, while also offering his assistance in facilitating such gatherings. He hopes that the Obama administration will follow suit.

Another Syrian aim is to terminate Egypt’s role as the prime mediator in Palestinian affairs, something Damascus has tried to do by sabotaging current efforts at inter-Palestinian reconciliation in Cairo. For this reason, and as a result of Syria’s entrenchment in the Iranian camp, Egypt’s relations with the Assad regime remain frigid. It has been rumored that the Egyptians oppose any rushed rapprochement between the Arab states and Syria. In light of this, the haplessness of the Qaddoumi ploy only confirmed the limitations of Syrian assets.

Meanwhile, American engagement of Syria has been cautious and slow, heightening Syrian frustrations. The Syrians earlier believed that an Obama administration downgrading in Iraq would come running to Syria. No such luck. Washington has successfully dealt with the Al-Qaeda threat in Iraq, not only without Syrian help, but in spite of Syria, and the US military withdrawal from Iraqi cities is proceeding fine.

This is why Assad’s meeting with Moqtada al-Sadr once more had the effect of drawing attention to Syrian marginality. The reality is that Sadr, who leans much more toward Iran than Syria, has been effectively sidelined by the United States and the Maliki government, not to mention by Iraqi voters. Once again, the Syrians are trading in expired goods.

With Iran in turmoil and Syria’s Lebanese allies defeated during the recent June elections, one can see why Assad is looking anywhere and everywhere for the semblance of strong cards. Ultimately, this reflects the fundamental flaw in the Syrian mirage: For structural reasons the Syrians cannot deliver what the US expects of them. Therefore, they trade in snake oil to create the illusion of importance.

When it comes to describing what dealing with Syria is all about, we can borrow from the title of a song by the American soul singer Clarence Carter. It’s like “getting the bills; but no merchandise.”

Tony Badran is a research fellow with the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.