A crisis has erupted between Iraq and Syria after the bombings in Baghdad last week that claimed hundreds of victims, dead and injured. The Iraqi government has blamed Syria for the attacks, declaring that Syria must choose between normal relations with Iraq or remaining a terrorist haven. These officials have also suggested that the Syrians are trying to forcefully carve a political role out for themselves in Iraq.
 
The bombings immediately followed a visit to Syria by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and occurred a week after a trip to Damascus by a delegation from US Central Command. The Iraqi government named two Baathist figures harbored by Syria as having a direct role in the attacks. Of the two, Muhammad Younis Ahmad bears closer attention.
 
A former Iraqi Baathist official, Ahmad tried forming a new leadership of the Iraqi Baath party at a conference in 2007, which he sought to hold under Syrian auspices. This led to his expulsion from the Baath led by Saddam Hussein’s former deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, who accused Ahmad of working with Syrian intelligence. The conference never saw the light, a testament to the political irrelevance of the figures involved.
 
At that time, and much like Maliki did earlier this month, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani led a delegation to Syria in order to discuss border security and the handing over of wanted figures--among them, it was rumored, Ahmad himself. And like today, the Syrians refused to accede to this.
 
Ahead of the recent Central Command visit, news reports indicated that the US military, too, had presented Syria with the names of individuals they wanted captured. The Syrians, with their usual evasiveness, apparently told certain foreign diplomats that they had expelled Ahmad earlier this year. Clearly, that claim was untrue as the Iraqis now say that they repeatedly requested Ahmad’s handover, to no avail.
 
More curious was what Iraqi official sources told the Al-Sabah daily several days after the Baghdad attacks. They said that Iraq had “recently rejected a Syrian wish to have a role in painting the Iraqi political landscape ... by creating a foothold for itself through figures close to [Damascus].” The sources noted that Syria was trying to “impose certain Baathist figures and open the way for them to participate in political life and the upcoming parliamentary elections.”
 
We can speculate that one such Baathist client would be Ahmad, whom the Syrians have been cultivating for over two years.
 
A quick perusal of the talking points the Syrians have distributed to their advocates in the media further supports this conclusion. The Syrians essentially explained to Maliki that there would be no security in Iraq without true “reconciliation”--meaning, without the inclusion of their Baathist clients such as Ahmad. That is why they told the Iraqi prime minister that they would not hand anyone over. Sami Moubayed, a Syrian commentator who often channels regime thinking, even wrote that Maliki now “realizes the folly of such a request”, since Syrian-harbored figures can “help bring about reconciliation” in Iraq. Thus, they were “a blessing in disguise” that Maliki “will use to bolster his own government.”
 
The Syrians tried to shape Maliki’s agenda ahead of his visit to Damascus. They leaked to the media that the purpose of the talks was not an Iraqi appeal that Syria hand over wanted figures, but rather that Maliki sought Syrian “help” in forming a “nationalist” electoral coalition, and perhaps even to use Syria as a counterweight to the Iraqi Awakening Councils.
 
The Syrians may have calculated that Maliki was politically vulnerable and had “lost the US umbrella.” Thus, they were wagering that he would see “the light in Damascus,” as Moubayed put it. The commentator even suggested that the Syrian bid enjoyed American cover, with the United States having “invited” the Syrians to “play a greater role in Iraqi affairs”!
 
Seen in this context, the Baghdad bombings were a familiar calling card from Syria: violent extortion to extract political gains. The use of Ahmad has also been a vintage tactic of the Syrians--which they have played effectively in such places as Lebanon and on the Palestinian front--namely sponsorship of splinter factions and the cultivation of clients who have no constituency, therefore who are reliant on Syria. This is endemic to Syrian behavior, and why we shouldn’t expect any change. Syria’s destabilization of its neighbors and interference in their affairs are the only tools permitting Damascus to project influence beyond its real political weight.
 
Maliki has, since, publicly rebuffed the Syrians. Iraq is not Lebanon. Such brazen Syrian acts will also have negative repercussions on the already cautious US engagement of Damascus. As one diplomat observed ahead of the Central Command visit, “the [US] effort to convince Syria to change its behavior is not open ended.” With Syria’s regional policies becoming increasingly destructive, we can only hope the diplomat is right.
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Tony Badran is a research fellow with the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.