On February 6, the website of the Free Patriotic Movement carried excerpts of an interview broadcast by the movement's channel OTV with Deputy Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. During the interview, moderated by Jean Aziz, Aoun said that his last meeting with Nasrallah was in November 2007. Nasrallah also said that his first personal contact with Aoun was in September 1997, "when Aoun called me and extended his condolences for my son's martyrdom."

Nasrallah: The personal impression was always in isolation from the political conflict. [This personal impression] is that the General is an honest figure and on such a basis, we could establish our alliance and we could establish a country. We were not mistaken about this, and we had no comments about the General. The General's only problem is that he is national and national and national.

[Question about the prisoners in Syria]

Nasrallah: I followed up on this issue, and the brothers in Hezbollah followed up on it, too. The answer came from the Syrians themselves that these prisoners are not in Syria. The Syrians also asked for a committee to settle the issue of the lost people in both countries. This committee should be the specialty of the authority. They adopted the issue of the Palestinian weapons outside the camps in the dialogue sessions and they asked us – Speaker Berri and me – to resolve this crisis. We told them that “you are the authority, and we can help.” When Saad al-Hariri and Siniora met with Ahmad Jibril, their allies attacked them. The negotiator should be the authority, not me as a party or a movement. The authority should seek to find a solution.

Aoun: The [Lebanese] state should handle this issue with the [Syrian] state, and there should be an investigation about the issue of those kidnapped. This issue should be settled; those who were killed should be announced as dead, those who were kidnapped should be announced as kidnapped, and those who are imprisoned should return. This issue should have been resolved prior to the withdrawal of the Syrian regime.

Nasrallah: We can help, but the official side should shoulder this responsibility. The authority is concerned with this issue; it is not the General's or my responsibility. There are Iranians lost in Lebanon, but no one moved and followed up on this issue. Even for the hostages in the Israeli prisons, the authority doesn't move or carry out any actions. This issue should have an end, since it is a humanitarian issue.

Those in Israel [the Lebanese people who live in Israel] are categorized into two parts: The first part consists of those who are slightly involved, and the other part includes those involved in the killings. We did not kill any Lebanese person. The French resistance executed thousands of French people [who dealt with the enemy], but we did not do this. The judiciary prosecutes those who perpetrated big crimes.

Aoun: We arranged some lists, but there was a political immobilization. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora refused and hindered the return of those living in Israel. For example, the daughter of Akl Hashem was prosecuted in absentia for 15 years, and she left Lebanon when she was eight years old. This was a negative indication to intimidate them and never let them return.

Nasrallah: The party [Hezbollah] offered them reassurances, and the General should ask them to return, while the state should facilitate their return, which did not happen.

The Memorandum of Understanding is very clear. We want a state in which all the nation's constituents participate. Any Muslim person believes that the utmost justice is secured by an Islamic state; just as every secular person believe that the utmost justice is secured by a secular state.

 Our vision for the Islamic regime is not imposed forcefully, especially in Lebanon, which is religiously divided. I cannot impose my decision. I am in front of two choices: either chaos or understanding. In Lebanon, the logic of majority and minority does not work. All Lebanese, namely the Christians, benefit from the consensual democracy, since any other choice damages and partitions the country. We agree that Lebanon is a message and a pattern and is the country of freedom. We are not seeking to change this reality, as this free reality suits us.

Aoun: As for consensual democracy, it is the period of pre-secularism. When we move from a certain political reality to another, we should be reassured. For example, the attempt to unite Europe forcefully failed, but then the regimes became stable, and when the country's entities were no longer threatened, unification seemed more feasible. Two years after this memorandum, we are highly reassured and comfortable, although the starting point differs between us. Relations should be between citizens and not between persons who belong to different sects. When we reach this stage, the person himself becomes more valuable.

I was in the opposition while Hezbollah was in the government. The understanding was between two sides, and a third side was missing, which was the authority. Two conditions should be achieved: the Shebaa Farms and the hostages. The third condition is determining the strategy with other sides so that the government follows it officially. The right of the resistance is a sacred right in Europe and all across the world. It is not a religious issue.

The Shebaa Farms are Lebanese lands according to international law. In 1989, I was the prime minister and objected to the occupation of the last farm. As for the hostages, we cannot leave or relinquish them when they were resisting. The weapons [of the resistance] are there to safeguard Lebanon. I was attacked in the media when I said that the incident that took place on the borders did not provoke a war [when Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, starting the July War]. My perception for the defensive strategy after the liberation of the Shebaa Farms and the return of the hostages will be a defensive one and not a liberation one. No one imposes limits to our self-defense. The weapons' role is to defend us, and if the weapons are not in the hands of the resistance, they should be with the army. We have the right to have weapons.

Nasrallah: The resistance is a reaction and a result. It is not the problem. Before 1989, this resistance was not a problem. But the Israelis came and occupied us. We would not have been here had it not been for the occupation. Therefore, Hezbollah has nothing to do with the emergence of the Islamic state in Iran between 1982 and 1985. There were numerous parties operating in the resistance. After 1985, we remained Amal and Hezbollah. In 1990, Hezbollah remained. We refused to be part of the authority and remained a resistance movement. At the core, Hezbollah is a resistance movement. At the time, political action was established, and in 1992, we entered parliament not to change the regime, but to allow the resistance to have a voice in this council.

We didn’t even talk about partnership in the authority. The point was to secure a voice for the resistance in parliament. The victory came in 2000, and we dedicated it to the entire Lebanese people. This accomplishment was achieved in 2000. Our arms are not militia arms because they only fought the Israelis. After 2000, Kofi Annan visited us, and we talked about the occupied land and the detainees. But no progress was achieved. Some people do not care about the border in the South. We left it to the government to try and bring back the detainees and restore the Shebaa Farms. We thus stopped our operations except for the reminder operations. If you ask the people residing along the border in the South, they will tell you that the situation between 1984 and 2000 was completely different than after 2000 and until 2006.

We created a balance of terror, and the people along the border started living comfortably after we provided them with protection. What is important is not the disarmament in itself as much as it is the removal of what entailed the presence of these arms, i.e. the occupation and the threat. The Israelis can make up any excuse to wage war on Lebanon, therefore there are no guarantees. We have a clear strategy and a clear model, and the answer has always been: We must surrender the arms. What is the alternative? We failed to liberate the land or secure the return of the detainees through diplomacy. The understanding with General Aoun is less than the understanding I reached with PM Rafik Hariri a few weeks before he was martyred.

He had told me he believed in the resistance not only to liberate the Shebaa Farms and restore the detainees, but also to achieve a just peace. I added, “Until a comprehensive settlement is achieved in accordance with Hezbollah’s standards.” He said, “If I am in the government when this is achieved, I will ask you what you want to do. If you do not want to surrender your arms, I would rather present my resignation than see the country become a second Algeria.” Nothing was signed between us because I trusted him.

This issue was raised with Saad Hariri, who agreed to it and made the same commitments as his father. It was also approved by Walid Jumblatt, whose position you know: He wants to liberate Jerusalem. With General Aoun, we talked about a national defense strategy, which should be approved by all certainly, with the exception of those who do not care. We then talked about a strong, just state that could protect them from any attack. We don’t want to keep these arms if there is a state willing to take this responsibility.

[Question about Hezbollah’s security apparatus]

Hezbollah doesn’t have a security apparatus in Lebanon. We have a security apparatus in the South for scouting, and a security apparatus to protect our cadres. We do not have an apparatus covering all of Lebanon. We have discovered many networks in the suburbs because we live in the suburbs and have a preemptive security body. They on the other side have security apparatuses and should be the ones uncovering the networks. As for the accusations I made against Israel, they are political accusations based on many points. For example, the network of Majzoub in Sidon which used to take suitcases of explosives; where did these suitcases filled with explosives go?

I always used to say to those who asked me to protect them from the Syrians, “Bring me evidence that Syria is responsible so I adopt a position toward the Syrians.” When I went to extend my condolences to Hariri’s family, and the whole family was present, the security tribunal was not established yet. The idea of a Saudi-Lebanese investigation committee was proposed, and I told them I would talk to the Syrian president. I talked to him, and he agreed without hesitation and without the interference of the Syria intelligence. I informed Hariri’s family of that. How can I accuse Syria without evidence? What is the secret behind this coup against the resistance and the history of the resistance?

They used this point to topple all the alliances and the commitments. I made a commitment that was not a secret one between me and Hariri, and I said it in the media: If it is proven that Syria killed Hariri, I stand alongside Hariri. However, it is neither acceptable nor fair to attack Syria before I have proof.

[Question to Aoun about the international tribunal not being mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding]

Aoun: We were the first to demand an international investigation committee, and we recognized what the official authorities are recognizing. Regarding the international investigation and after three years, we have not reached anything. There are people who were arrested and whose cases should be looked into. There are other means besides arresting them, such as preventing them from travelling and placing them under house arrest. The paper [the Memorandum of Understanding] was a great thing. It consecrated the policy of understanding and openness, and not the policy of clashes. This can be felt in the Bekaa, the South and in East Sidon. The psychological friction lines were removed in Ain al-Remmaneh, and I sensed that personally. The natural interaction between the people was resumed.

The July War also consecrated this understanding and toppled numerous fears and reservations. In the dialogue I put it forward before everyone so that it was studied and discussed, even if it was attacked at the level of the state, and even though we were accused of being affiliated to certain axes. It is a Lebanese paper. It turned out that any understanding between the Lebanese was prohibited to allow the passing of certain projects such as the [New] Middle East, the nationalization of the Palestinians and the [cancellation of their] right of return. This understanding closed many doors. I don’t know where the terrorism accusations came from, as we were only trying to protect Lebanon. Personally, and after Hezbollah entered the government while I was in the opposition, I wondered: Am I accused of terrorism or is Hezbollah accused of terrorism? Am I not allowed to talk to Hezbollah?

Nasrallah: This document is the main draft that set the foundation for the dialogue table around which the majority of the document’s articles were discussed. We brought two prominent political movements to the dialogue table, both of which reached an agreement over these articles. Internal peace is one which enters the hearts and the homes. I use this expression which the General always says about internal peace. Ever since the Taif Agreement was signed, and until the exit of the Syrians, the Muslims were - for the majority - the allies of Syria. Those in the March 14 forces were among its closest allies, and the Christians were frustrated. After the Syrian exit, another type of division emerged in Lebanon.

However, the majority of Christians were also on the other side. This is why we say February 14, because on March 14, the Free Patriotic Movement was with them. Following this division, the understanding secured peace after the acute tensions and did not establish a Christian-Shia alliance. The General and I answered this question and said that this alliance was the nucleus of the national alliance we felt. The level of communication became different in all areas. It set the bases for communication and psychological and spiritual peace. Hence, when the Black Sunday events occurred, strife was thwarted because of this understanding. Not because of its three pages, but because of what it achieved in two years. The friction-line language was thus toppled and eliminated. This internal peace is the greatest accomplishment.

Aoun: There is something important that should be mentioned. Within 24 hours, the aftermath of February 5 was erased because of this understanding, despite the violence that occurred one day earlier. The Sunday events were a blood baptism for this understanding, one which we managed to overcome peacefully. The following Sunday witnessed a natural demonstration of national unity and was not a political occasion.

Nasrallah: The biggest achievement was accomplished during the July War. Israel recognized its defeat, the resistance won, and Lebanon, of course, won. The key element, beyond the resistance and the fighting of the men, was the popular support granted to these fighters. Their parents were displaced, and over one million displaced people were embraced by the Lebanese, especially in the Christian areas. They were embraced by the Free Patriotic Movement, Marada and the Church. Had it not been for this climate, the situation would’ve been different, and had it not been for this embrace, we could have lost the war or headed toward a civil one.

As for the Winograd Report, it didn’t aim to do us justice but to serve Israel and correct the mistakes. What was concealed in it was even more important, especially the part that actually did us justice and talked about the fact that the war decision had been issued in advance and that the war plans were ready for the end of September, beginning of October, considering that the tourism season would have ended, that they would be more prepared, and that the congressional elections would have been held. We thank God that it happened in July, because in October, there was a plan to annihilate us in three days in accordance with a surprise plan. This failure secured our victory. Olmert’s government neither achieved a political accomplishment nor a military one.

We thank Winograd for his honesty regarding the future, for this entity is built on power and arrogance. Waging wars should be done in specific international and regional circumstances and also with respect to military capacity. It should also take into consideration the decision of the Israeli government and the tolerance ability of the Israeli people. When I talked about possessing missiles that could reach Israel, I was not flaunting our abilities. I was trying to prevent the war from erupting by forcing Israel to take into consideration the fact that there is no safe place in occupied Palestine. Through our readiness, we tried to postpone the war because Israel needed to be ready to wage it.

Aoun: Even if there was no paper of understanding, I should be with my people during the war and blame Hezbollah after the war. But during the war, I am with my people. On February 14, PM Hariri was assassinated. We were the first to participate in the protests. Everything changed, and everyone became part of the authority, while I became part of the opposition. When President Assad attacked PM Siniora, we stood behind him, and when a subpoena was issued against Walid Jumblatt, we stood behind him. I work in accordance with my convictions, and this has nothing to do with any political agreements. The understanding did not intend to allow us to partake in ruling. War erupted as they were still ruling. We demanded a national-unity government.

In the Winograd Report, I tried to look for the parts that were erased, because we know the majority of what was announced, and we know the position of the government toward the war. If we want to make a comparison, by being allied to Hezbollah, I became an ally of Syria and Iran. Therefore, since the Lebanese government is allied with America, which is supporting Israel with airplanes, ammunition and smart bombs, and by using the same aforementioned standards, I would say the government was allied with Israel. Those who want to uphold independence are accusing half the Lebanese people of collaborating with foreign forces. Where does the solution start? With half of Lebanon? A concerned rule should start with national unity.

Regarding the return of Amr Moussa, an agreement should be reached over the president, over the second article and all the articles before starting the implementation. A partial implementation is impossible to carry out. As for the guarantees, they should emerge from all the Lebanese, and this is what I told the French president when he put forward the guarantees. I told him that international and regional policies changed, which is why we wanted guarantees among each other, we the Lebanese, who respected the Arab guarantees provided for the implementation of Taif. We should assume the responsibility. The consensus candidate is a candidate to uphold consensus.

We have adopted the candidacy of General Sleiman to uphold the consensus, and we support him within the context of the articles we put forward. They are the earned rights of the Lebanese people, because we cannot allow the exclusion of the strongest candidate for the presidency and see the election of another president. There are attempts to exclude us. Therefore, there was no agreement. The president cannot do anything. The rhetoric of the loyalists is not a consensus one but rather one of escalation. Saying we are restraining the president with our conditions is misleading.

I have no problem with General Sleiman, and the issue is not one between two people. It is between us and those who hold the majority. As for the guaranteeing third, I already gave up on those who I represent by withdrawing my candidacy. I cannot shock my popular base by relinquishing my participation and rendering my presence only in form.

Nasrallah: Regarding the Mar Mikhael events, I extend my condolences to the families of the martyrs. There are many readings and analyses. Since the first night, we demanded an investigation and the transfer of the dossier to the military judiciary without giving the information we had to the media outlets. We all presented the information we had to the security bodies involved in the investigations. We in Hezbollah have decided not to put forward any reading so that we do not place pressures on the investigations. We demand fairness and justice. When General Sleiman visited me, I insisted on the investigation, a thing which he did as well.

We are still following the investigations, which have been ongoing in a serious and satisfying way. We do not want people to be randomly held responsible. We want facts and for the responsibilities to be defined. What happened is not permissible, and I said that to General Sleiman. There were many similar incidents that were dealt with differently. Therefore, investigations should be conducted to see whether or not there were bad intentions. I cannot make any accusations, which is why we need the investigations. Assuming that this action was not spontaneous and that Hezbollah and Amal did send this group to take to the streets, this doesn’t change anything to the facts.

[Nasrallah then recalled the January 23, 2007 events and how the FPM and the opposition were shot at and beaten and how the security forces handled the situation; and of the January 25, 2007 events at the Arab University and how the army did not shoot back at those who shot at it.]

I consider all those who were martyred to be like Martyr Hadi [Nasrallah's son]. We should handle these events by containing the incident, through justice and serious investigations. I told General Sleiman that protecting the army is done through a serious and decisive investigation. For three years, the army has managed to uphold national unity because it defended everyone. When it starts serving one team, it will lose and so will Lebanon. The military institution should be preserved for Lebanon’s sake. As for the families of the martyrs, I assure them that the investigations will continue day and night until it reaches a result and accusations are made.

Aoun: We were subjected to media and political attacks aiming to undermine this understanding, and it is still present for all the Lebanese to join. This is the way toward peace.

Nasrallah: In the end, I would like to say that even if the understanding did not emerge, the July War would have been waged. We talked about a national-unity government after the understanding, and the idea became more persistent after the war in light of the government’s behavior. This understanding has brought tranquility, and we need trust. The strategic problem now resides in the lack of trust, and by cooperating with each other, we can restore it.