Those familiar with Syria know how rarely the regime, or its official media outlets, speak truthfully. The Lebanese have learned, through listening to pro-Syrian figures like Wiam Wahab or Nasser Qandil, to interpret what is really going on in Damascus. In the US, it is no different. With a limp Arab League Summit opening today in the Syrian capital, it is worth recalling some of the testimonies and “wisdom” dispensed by US-based, regime-friendly academics and experts to get a truly accurate gauge of Syria’s true intentions vis-à-vis Lebanon and the region.

Does Syrian President Bashar al-Assad want friendly diplomatic relations with the US in exchange for giving up “what he views as a long historical and cultural right with respect to Lebanon?” This was the pointed question Senator John Kerry asked Syria expert and pro-engagement pundit David Lesch during November’s Senate subcommittee hearings on whether or not the US should enlist Syria’s support to help resolve the crises in both Lebanon and Iraq.
 
“He's not going to give [Lebanon] up. Syrians are not going to give [Lebanon] up. Lebanon is important to Syria,” admitted Lesch, before being interrupted by Kerry, once again with a very prudent question.  “So then how does [Bashar al-Assad] have a good relationship with the United States if he won’t respect Lebanese sovereignty and democracy?” he demanded.

Talking to NOW Lebanon, Lesch, despite his unequivocal assessment to the subcommittee, appeared to still endorse talking to Damascus. “From my perspective, the Bush administration policy is counterproductive right now by just offering the stick, so to speak… In my view, opening a dialogue could lead to at least some movement for a resolution to the impasse in Lebanon but could also bear fruit on the Syrian-Israeli front, as well,” he argued.

With the US elections just over seven months away, American politicians – keen to open a fresh era with a different track – are seeking out new authorities on old problems, like Syria. What is disturbing is that the pro-engagement pundits clearly understand what Syria really wants with Lebanon and, yet, they still argue that dialogue is the best way forward.

In doing so, however, they ultimately reject principle after principle of international law regarding the right to sovereignty of modern nation states.  As one anti-engagement analyst, Tony Badran, quite aptly put it, “The issue is the re-domination of Lebanon, the termination of the tribunal, the assassination of its leaders, journalists, judges and politicians, as well as its civilians. The issue is the terrorist war being waged against a sovereign country and its institutions by a terrorist rogue regime.”

Still, there is no shortage of respected academics keen to portray Damascus as a potential partner for cooperation or simply a misunderstood but proud Arab nation with modest regional ambitions who can be easily brought over.

The stateside engagonistas

Lesch, a professor of history at Trinity University in Texas who recently published The New Lion of Damascus, a biography of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is not alone. University of Oklahoma Professor Joshua Landis, who moderates the controversial blog SyriaComment.com, also has long argued for engagement.

Landis has even dressed-up Lebanese-Syrian tension as part of a “legitimate [Syrian] grievance,” with regional implications, one which the US should hear. “America, I think, is going to be forced to bend to that [Syrian will]. If [the US] continues to resist, we're going to see more violence [in Lebanon],” said Landis.

Then, of course, there is Patrick Seale, Hafez al-Assad’s biographer and arguably the godfather of all Syria experts. This is what he has to say on the matter of Lebanese-Syrian relations: “So long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved, Syria has vital security interests in Lebanon, where it cannot tolerate a hostile government or the influence of a hostile external power.”

Elsewhere in the pro-engagement orbit, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Malley, two foreign policy advisors to Democratic candidate and open engagonista Barack Obama, have made a similar case.  Brzezinski currently argues for “engagement rather than ostracism and criticism” with rogue states like Syria and Iran.  And Robert Malley, as head of the Middle East section at the International Crisis Group, does the same. Although he explained to the subcommittee in November that he had no doubt that Syria's goals and the United States' goals were clearly antagonistic – essentially, Syria wants to interfere in Lebanese affairs and wants to do away with the international tribunal – he still advocates engagement.

What Syria wants

The tribunal is key to current relations. It is widely expected to implicate high-ranking Syrian figures in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and Syria feels it cannot let this happen. “The Syrian regime undoubtedly considers [the international tribunal] a mortal threat and will go to great lengths to eliminate it,” explained Malley.

Towing the Syrian line, which dismisses the tribunal as a US-driven political tool rather than a mechanism for justice, Landis wrote recently in his blog that “the international tribunal is the center piece of US strategy. It is the only strategy of those listed here that could possible lead European nations to join a sanctions regime against Damascus.”
 
Also key is Syria’s continued influence over Hezbollah, which it uses to provoke Israel, as was seen in the July 2006 war.  “Damascus also sees Lebanon exclusively through the prism of it national security interests: It perceives Hezbollah as a critical asset in its struggle with Israel,” testified Malley. 

Landis agreed to much the same thing in a recent op-ed.  Syria “will not sacrifice its relations with Hizbullah for good press from Saudi Arabia,” he wrote, referring to Saudi criticism of Syria’s Lebanon policy.  “Syria is being asked to sacrifice its strategic relations with Hizbullah for what?” he asked.

All this points to one thing: The regime, by fomenting instability, wants to eventually facilitate the return of its intelligence – and perhaps, even military – personnel to Lebanese soil.  Even with the Golan on the table or a Syrian-Israeli peace deal, Syria is not yet ready to give up its influence in Lebanon. 

“The big complicating factor [regarding US policy toward Syria] is Lebanon,” confirmed Lesch to NOW Lebanon. “And from my discussions in Syria – and I was there in early February – they’re not going to budge on that issue.  So, this could be a long-simmering and long-standing obstacle to any sort of engagement between the United States and Syria.”

“During the 1990s, the relationship [between Syria and Lebanon] became one of wholesale domination.  Syria mastered and manipulated Lebanon’s politics, plundered its economic resources and arrested and detained its citizens at will,” acknowledged Malley in his testimony. 

Despite the lessons offered by recent history and the lengthy list of “fundamental” Syrian demands, Malley and his peers still insist that Assad is prepared to back down in return for just a few “carrots.”  Like what?  Scrapping the tribunal?  Unconditionally delivering the Golan?  Denouncing the government of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora?  Those are large carrots indeed. 

And for those US policymakers hoping such sacrifices might succeed in driving the much-coveted wedge between Syria and Iran, it is worth noting that even the regime’s foaming American mouthpieces concede such a divorce is unlikely.

“For the past quarter century, Iran has been Syria’s most loyal, most dependable and, at some points, only ally,” testified Malley. “Damascus will not abandon this relationship for the sake of renewed dialogue with the US or an entry fare for negotiations with Israel.”  The Syrian regime is no more willing to moderate its support for Hezbollah, Hamas or various other radical Palestinian groups like Ahmed Jibril’s PFLP-GC, which have for so long served it well.

What next?

The behavior of the Syrian regime stands on its own as evidence.  And, if that is not enough, it speaks through its American academic interlocutors like Landis, Malley, Lesch and Brzezinski. It should be clear to all that “engagement” with Syria will lead nowhere.  Writing in the Huffington Post on March 24, blogger Robert Benson summed it up neatly: “The Syrians seem to view a continued presence in Lebanon, as well as derailing the tribunal to some degree as essential to the well being of the regime… any concessions [the US] makes to Syria on Lebanon will be directly hurting our interests as well as selling out our Lebanese allies.”

What is the solution then?  Perhaps the best answer is the simplest one, the one that has already been Okayed by the Lebanese and the international community.  As Badran quite rightly points out, “If you're looking for a solution, how about the one proposed by the Lebanese themselves, as well as the Arabs, the Europeans and the Americans: that the Lebanese be left alone to run their own affairs, that they not be murdered and subverted, that their neighbor should not maintain a client group in the country and use it to wage war on another neighbor.”

The Arab street – the real one, in which car bombs explode, rather than the pompous metaphor for the regional barometer – is where policy becomes endgame, and it is there, amid the mangled metal, the body parts and the terrifying state of panic, that Syria talks to its neighbors. Damascus’s US “engagonistas” should consider this before they speak for a regime they clearly do not really know, on subjects about which they know even less.