The memorandum of understanding signed on Monday between Hezbollah and Salafists groups, represented mainly by Hassan al-Chahhal’s Belief and Justice Movement, was yet another attempt to weaken the Future Movement’s popularity on the Sunni street and presents the Salafists as being more open to dialogue and cooperation. It was also further revealed that Hezbollah still assumes the mantle of guardian of the nation’s security with total disregard for the authority and role of the state, while what Salafists there are in Lebanon are fragmented with no common agenda.

Divisions highlighted

Hassan Chahhal represents only one face of the Salafist movement in Lebanon, which is known to be united only through ideology rather than approach. His group, organized around a charity, is described by analysts as the Salafist-lite, and spreads its ideology through social activities. It is still unclear exactly why he put pen to paper.
The other faction, represented by Sheikh Dai al-Islam al-Chahhal, the founder of the Salafist Movement in Lebanon, is more hard line. It believes in the concept of jihad – or struggle – as a tool to spread its ideology, and it issued a “call to arms” to Sunni youths in the immediate wake of the May events, presenting his movement as a robust middle ground between al-Qaeda and the moderate Sunnis who “failed to protect Beirut.”
Speaking to NOW Lebanon, Sheikh Dai described the MOU signature as an understanding between “a giant and a child,” adding that it was unfair to Sunnis in Lebanon “because it can only be beneficial to Hezbollah.”

According to Sheikh Dai, the Belief and Justice Movement is too insignificant to sign an understanding with a strong organization which considers itself more powerful than the state. “I also know from sources close to [Hassan Chahhal] that he was not part of the negotiations preceding the signature and, until last night, he was unwilling to sign,” he said.

Sheikh Dai considers the deal superficial because it did not tackle major issues, such as the sporadic clashes between the Sunni and Alawi communities in Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen, Hezbollah’s arms, or the overall security situation in Lebanon. “We have always agreed on the issues presented in the MOU. We need to reach a resolution on real issues. Isn’t the opposition involved in the Tripoli clashes? Isn’t Hezbollah part of the opposition?”

Bilal Dokmak, another Salafist figure in Tripoli, told NOW Lebanon that the MOU does not mean anything so long as it overlooks the Islamic detainees issue and the Hezbollah assault on the Sunnis in Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon last May. “Hezbollah chose the weakest part of the Salafist movement, which does not represent the Salafists in Lebanon, and used them for its own advantage,” he said. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, the MOU is undoubtedly part of its plan to contain the Sunni rage and tension that resulted from the May events, just before the start of the national dialogue, where discord is expected between the Future Movement and Hezbollah.

The authority of Hezbollah

The agreement is also an attempt to contain any Shia-Sunni strife, resulting from the Tripoli clashes, and convince the Lebanese that Hezbollah wants to restore security in Tripoli, and other parts of Lebanon. In this way it also undermines the state, which has been unable to make any real headway in curbing violence and maintaining security. However, Hezbollah seems to have forgotten that these Salafists groups were empowered after Hezbollah’s assault on Beirut and the Sunni street in May, because they were able to present themselves as a more aggressive alternative to the Future Movement. And yet only three months later, Hezbollah wants to convince us that they are concerned about security.

Amal MP Ali Hassan Khalil called, in a speech on Sunday, for confronting alleged “terrorist plots aimed at separating the north from the rest of Lebanon.” He also said that [Amal and Hezbollah] are concerned about stability and security in every area of Lebanon. Khalil failed to mention that the fallout from the deadly clashes the two parties inspired in both Beirut and Tripoli and the ongoing presence of Hezbollah’s weapons, continues to hinder any chance of national unity.

Thus Hezbollah alternates between violence and diplomacy, whenever it suits its agenda. In May the party attacked Beirut, the Mountain and other areas in Lebanon because violence was the best and quickest way to undermine the state. Today, with the national dialogue looming, diplomacy seems to be the more effective method to soak up the tensions it created.

In either case, Hezbollah always seems to circumvent the state in the process. Whether the party resorts to bullying or budget diplomacy, the state is their last reference. Right before the national dialogue conference, where an extensive dialogue is to start under the state’s authority, Hezbollah has once again set the tone by doing its own thing, the consequences of which remain to be seen.