An insight into the challenges of post-war reconstruction in Lebanon
They say that war is the pursuit of political objectives through force. In the history of Arab-Israeli wars, victory has always been a precarious and multifaceted concept. It has never been defined solely by territorial or military gains but by the persistence of the cause and the survival of political regimes. In this context, defeat was never an option—a narrative no party was willing to accept. This fact made the struggle as much about survival and resilience as it was about achieving outright victory.
The Arab-Israeli wars of the early decades were essentially symmetric, fought between conventional state armies. However, this dynamic began to shift following the Syrian-Israeli disengagement accord of May 1974 and the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accord of September 1978. These agreements marked the decline of large-scale state-led wars and the rise of asymmetric conflicts characterized by the involvement of non-state actors like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hezbollah, and Hamas.
This shift profoundly altered the nature of the conflict and its implications for regional politics. In Lebanon, the role and authority of the Lebanese state and its institutions were significantly diminished during the Israeli invasion of 1982, the 2006 war, and the recent conflict. The Lebanese Government’s focus shifted primarily to relief efforts, responding to the displacement crisis and the distribution of aid, while decisions regarding war, ceasefire, and peace were effectively transferred to Hezbollah and, by extension, to Iran.
A telling example is the Government’s struggle to secure a quorum for its meeting on November 26, the day of the ceasefire, due to the absence of several ministers. Moreover, many ministers and members of parliament later expressed frustration, stating that they had not been informed about the content of the ceasefire agreement beforehand. Another example is the inconsistent declaration of emergencies during crises. For instance, the Lebanese Government declared a state of emergency during the COVID-19 pandemic to curb the virus’s spread, mobilizing national resources and enforcing measures to protect public health. However, no similar state of emergency was declared during the recent war despite the significant loss of life, displacement of civilians, and widespread destruction.
This transformation in the nature of warfare also redefined the criteria for determining winners and losers. In asymmetric wars, outcomes are not measured by traditional metrics like territorial conquest or military dominance. Instead, victory is defined by achieving strategic objectives, maintaining legitimacy, and ensuring long-term sustainability. A weaker party can claim victory simply by surviving and continuing its operations, while a stronger opponent risks being perceived as a loser if it fails to secure precise, lasting results.
Adding to the complexity is the religious dimension of these conflicts, particularly in Lebanon and Gaza. For groups like Hezbollah, victory is framed not merely in political or military terms but as a divine achievement, making the very concept of victory deeply subjective and often elusive.
According to the Israeli wars on Lebanon tracker, the 2006 July War lasted 34 days, while the April 1996 conflict, known as Operation Grapes of Wrath, lasted 16 days. However, the exact duration of the recent war remains unclear. This ambiguity arises not only from the fragility of the ceasefire and the high risk of resumption of hostilities but also from the confusion surrounding reporting the war’s starting point. If the war’s starting point is considered to be October 8, 2023 – the day Hezbollah unilaterally decided to activate the southern front in support of Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood operation – then, the war lasted 415 days. Alternatively, if the starting point is deemed to be September 23, 2024, when Israel launched a series of airstrikes under Operation Northern Arrows, then the war would have lasted 64 days. It is worth noting that the strikes initiated on September 23, 2024, resulted in 492 deaths, including 35 children, and injured over 1,600 individuals, making it the deadliest day in Lebanon since the 1975–1990 civil war.
They say, “only the dead have seen the end of war.” According to reports published by the Ministry of Public Health, by the day of the ceasefire, 3,961 people were dead, 16,520 injured, and more than 1 million displaced. If the cost of conflict is measured in the ruins of cities, communities, and the human spirit, then the estimated losses and damages amount to $8.5 billion, which accounts for nearly 50% of Lebanon’s GDP, according to the World Bank’s Lebanon Interim Damage and Loss Assessment report published in mid-November. The losses and damages resulting from the July 2006 war did not exceed 10% of GDP.
Economic losses from the recent war are estimated at $5.1 billion, while damages to physical structures are valued at $3.4 billion, with housing being the hardest-hit sector. Approximately 100,000 housing units were partially or entirely damaged, directly affecting around 500,000 individuals. An estimated 166,000 people lost their jobs, leading to a loss of $168 million in earnings.
According to the same report, the commerce sector was the most affected, with $1.7 billion in losses and $178 million in damages. The agriculture sector lost $1.1 billion, with damages of $124 million, while the tourism sector suffered $1.1 billion in losses and $18 million in damages.
Following the 2006 war, Arab Gulf countries and Lebanon’s international partners raced to support the rebuilding of devastated areas and infrastructure. Lebanon received approximately $3.6 billion in assistance, including $940 million pledged at the Stockholm Conference on August 31, 2006. During that conflict, Gulf countries provided $1.1 billion in grants, including $500 million from Saudi Arabia and $300 million each from Kuwait and Qatar. Additionally, Saudi Arabia deposited $1 billion in Lebanon’s Central Bank, and Kuwait contributed $500 million to bolster foreign reserves. Gulf countries also followed then-Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s advice by adopting and rebuilding villages – Qatar in Khiam and Bint Jbeil, and the UAE in Marjeyoun and the towns of Al-Arqoub as examples.
Today, the Government has yet to present a plan for early recovery and reconstruction following the recent war. The Paris Conference in October 2024 raised approximately $800 million for humanitarian aid and an additional $200 million to support the Lebanese Army, even as the monthly cost of basic needs for the displaced reached $250 million.
In 2004, the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was awarded the UNESCO Avicenna Gold Medal for his efforts to rebuild Lebanon after the civil war – a moment now feels like a distant memory. Today, those affected by the war have been abandoned to their fate, with no clear plans to rebuild their homes or support the recovery of the private sector – the last standing pillar of Lebanon’s fragile economy.
Khalil Gebara is an academic and researcher.
The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW.
