Hezbollah faces a strategic dilemma as the unexpected short ceasefire extension, announced by the White House despite its opposition, signals shifting decision-making beyond its control amidst Lebanon's uncertain political future.
As the February 18 ceasefire extension was announced, one detail stood out: it was neither extended for a full month nor negotiated publicly—it was announced directly by the White House. In a conflict where Hezbollah has long claimed to be a key player, this was a clear sign that decisions are being made elsewhere.
The question is: why such a short extension? The most likely answer is that regional and international actors are waiting to see if Lebanon can form a new government—and under what conditions. If Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam succeeds, what will Hezbollah demand in return?
Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem declared just hours before the extension that “there will be no extension”. Yet, the extension happened. Was this a miscalculation? A bluff? Or does Hezbollah simply no longer control the pace of events?
With just weeks until the ceasefire’s next expiration, Hezbollah finds itself in a dilemma it cannot easily escape: if it returns to war, it risks collapse; if it accepts peace, it risks irrelevance.
A Resistance That Can No Longer Afford War
For decades, Hezbollah positioned itself as the ultimate resistance force—the only faction capable of standing against Israel, the stabilizer of Lebanon, the regional player that could dictate its own terms. But the reality today is different.
The war has drained Hezbollah in ways it did not anticipate:
- Thousands of its rockets, drones, and fighters have been lost to Israeli airstrikes.
- Iran’s economic struggles and logistical hardships including the collapse of the Syrian regime have slowed the financial pipeline that keeps Hezbollah armed and operational.
- Its social base is exhausted—many Shia families in the south, displaced for months, are unwilling to accept a long war that could destroy their future.
For the first time in its history, Hezbollah might not be able to sustain a prolonged confrontation.
Yet, backing down is just as dangerous. The movement built its legitimacy on being a resistance force—not just a political party. Accepting de-escalation without extracting a clear victory would damage its standing, both locally and within Iran’s broader regional strategy. This is the greatest challenge Hezbollah has ever faced: it can neither afford war nor afford to be seen as weak.
A Changing Political Landscape
Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanese politics is facing unprecedented shifts. Hezbollah has long dominated Lebanon’s security narrative, but the formation of a new government under Nawaf Salam presents a direct challenge to its influence. Internally, the group is grappling with divisions over how to navigate shifting regional dynamics, particularly in its relationships with Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Meanwhile, its traditional allies are weaker than ever, with even Amal—its closest partner—showing signs of unease over the long-term costs of continued escalation. For the first time in years, Hezbollah’s influence is being actively questioned. While it remains Lebanon’s most powerful faction, it is no longer an untouchable one.
This is why the February 18 ceasefire extension is so crucial—it is not just about war or peace, but about how much space Hezbollah still has to maneuver.
What Happens Next?
With less than three weeks until the ceasefire expires, Hezbollah finds itself in an unfamiliar position—reactive rather than dominant. Its ability to dictate Lebanon’s security landscape has been severely weakened, and its usual strategy of controlled escalation may no longer be viable. Given these constraints, Hezbollah has four paths forward:
- Shift the battleground from military to political survival
The group’s missile stockpiles have been depleted, its infrastructure has suffered significant blows, and its regional allies are either disengaged or unwilling to escalate further. In this reality, Hezbollah’s immediate priority may not be military confrontation but rather securing its political position. Instead of battlefield victories, it will seek to maintain control over key institutions, leverage its alliances, and obstruct any reforms that threaten its influence. - Exploit Lebanon’s fragile political system
If Hezbollah perceives the new government formation as a threat to its dominance, it could resort to parliamentary deadlock, blocking key appointments, or manipulating sectarian tensions to maintain control. With the opposition gaining ground and the international community watching closely, Hezbollah may attempt to weaken state institutions from within rather than confronting external forces militarily. - Use controlled instability as a bargaining tool
While direct escalation may be off the table, Hezbollah can still use calculated political and security disruptions to remind regional and international actors of its presence. This could include media campaigns, strategic protests, or limited security incidents—designed not to trigger a full-scale war but to reinforce the notion that Lebanon cannot be stabilized without Hezbollah’s involvement. - Follow Iran’s orders and recalibrate its strategy
Tehran may determine that Hezbollah’s long-term survival is more valuable than engaging in another costly conflict. If Iran signals a need for de-escalation, Hezbollah may focus on consolidation, regaining domestic credibility, and preparing for future political battles. However, this path would require Hezbollah to find new ways to justify its continued armed presence, especially as regional players push for a different security arrangement in Lebanon.
The next few weeks will define Hezbollah’s future—not just in military terms, but in its ability to maintain its grip on Lebanon’s fractured political landscape. If it escalates, can it afford the consequences? If it de-escalates, can it survive politically? For decades, Hezbollah set the rules of the game. But now, as international forces push for a new political reality, one question remains:
Is Hezbollah still the player, or has it become the played?
Ramzi Abou Ismail is a political psychologist and researcher at the University of Kent.
The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW.
