HomeOpinionColumnsThe Druze Dilemma: Political Survival or a Future Beyond Fear?

The Druze Dilemma: Political Survival or a Future Beyond Fear?


Members of Syria's new authorities security forces deploy in the mostly Druze and Christian Jaramana suburb of Damascus late on March 2, 2025. Syria's new authorities deployed security forces on March 2 in Jaramana following a fatal shooting at a checkpoint two days earlier, before clashes erupted a day later between security forces and local gunmen tasked with protecting the area, state media and a war monitor said amid tensions after Israeli demands to protect the minority group. (Photo by Bakr ALKASEM / AFP)

A lot has been said about the Druze in the region, but little has been done to address the fundamental question: Are Druze leaders actually protecting their people, or are they exploiting their fear for political survival? Across the Levant, Druze communities have long navigated a precarious existence, shifting allegiances to ensure their survival. But today, this historical pragmatism has become something else—an excuse for leaders to manipulate their people, forcing them into narratives that serve political agendas rather than genuine security.

At the heart of this issue lies a hard truth: only a just and civil state can truly protect minorities. Yet history has forced many Druze to cling to religion or sectarian identity as a shield against persecution. Today, both Israel and Druze leaders exploit this fear, framing political choices as existential ones. But survival should not be a bargaining chip. The Druze do not need saviors—they need a political vision that moves beyond survival politics.

 

The Druze Leadership Divide: Three Figures, Many Perspectives

Today, three main leaders dominate Druze political discourse: Walid Jumblatt in Lebanon, Sheikh Hikmat Hajari in Syria, and Sheikh Muwafaq Tareef in Israel. Each represents a different faction, narrative, and regional positioning. Yet, many Druze fall outside these structures entirely. Many reject the notion that their future should be determined by sectarian calculations and instead believe in the state as the sole legitimate protector of minorities.

The growing regional struggle for Druze influence creates a dangerous illusion: that Druze must choose between aligning with Jews or Sunnis, between seeking an independent state or adhering to an Arab-Islamic identity. This false dichotomy is a political trap. It forces Druze communities into a position where they appear to have no real choice—only to submit to the ethnic projects of the region.

 

The Danger of Ethnic Identity Politics

The idea of legitimizing Druze as a singular ethnicity across borders feeds into a broader regional trend—the rise of ethnic and sectarian states. This framing makes the discussion no longer about whether we oppose ethnic states as a principle, but rather which ethnic states we approve and which we reject. This is a dangerous path, as it undermines the very foundation of a civil state based on equal citizenship for all.

If we accept that Druze identity should be unified across the Levant, we inadvertently legitimize the same logic that drives the ethnic fragmentation of the region—a logic that has fueled endless conflict, divisions, and instability. Druze survival does not depend on a sectarian or ethnic identity but on building states where all citizens are equal under the law.

 

A Critique of the Jumblatt Narrative: Politics Over Reflection

My criticism of Walid Jumblatt is not personal—it is about a perspective that has shaped Druze politics for decades. His insistence on tying Druze survival to a broader Arab or Islamic identity has historically placed the community in geopolitical conflicts that did not always serve its interests. This perception—one that sees Druze as duty-bound to Arabism and Islamism—is part of what fueled the Lebanese Civil War. Jumblatt’s refusal to reflect on or reassess this approach is not just a mistake; it is a political failure.

By refusing to reexamine past decisions, Jumblatt keeps the Druze in a position where they are always part of a regional struggle rather than independent political actors within a national framework. This approach risks placing Druze interests at odds with other Lebanese factions rather than seeking common ground for a shared national future.

 

As a Druze, I Reject the Politics of Fear

As a Druze, I appreciate and respect Druze communities everywhere. I deeply understand the historical persecution they have faced. It is no coincidence that Druze built their homes in the mountains long before heating systems existed—this was not a love for the snow but a necessity to escape persecution.

This alone proves a fundamental truth: minorities cannot truly thrive without equal status under civil laws and secular governance. The Druze survived through resilience, but survival alone is not enough. Thriving requires a political framework that protects all citizens equally, rather than reinforcing divisions based on sectarian fears.

 

We Do Not Share a Common Destiny Across Borders—And That’s Okay

While Druze share a history of struggle, they do not share a single political destiny. Sultan al-Atrash did not ask the Lebanese Druze before launching the Syrian revolution, and Walid Jumblatt did not consult Druze in Daliyat al-Karmel before supporting the Palestinian resistance. These were national decisions made within the context of each country’s reality.

Thus, the idea that Druze should act as one political entity across multiple countries is deeply flawed. The Druze in Lebanon must decide what works for them, just as Druze elsewhere must decide what works for them. Some may align with Tareef, others with Jumblatt, but many reject both. We reject Israeli protection just as much as we reject external Arab interference in our affairs. Our fate is tied to our country, not to a transnational sectarian identity.

 

As a Lebanese I Reject All Three Options—I Choose the State

Politically, I reject all three dominant options presented to the Druze today:

  • I reject relying on Ahmad al-Sharaa or any external Arab intervention.
  • I reject seeking protection from Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel.
  • I reject using an Islamic identity as a survival mechanism.

The Druze in Lebanon do not need a foreign backer or a sectarian shield—we need a democratic state where we are equal citizens, not political pawns. Our future is not in choosing between regional powers but in building a Lebanon that is fair, secular, and inclusive of all its people.

For too long, Druze politics has been defined by fear and reactionary alliances. It is time to break that cycle. The choice is clear: Do we continue down the road of sectarian politics, or do we fight for a Lebanon where minorities do not need a protector—because the state protects them all? I choose the latter.

 

Ramzi Abou Ismail is a  political psychologist and researcher at the University of Kent.

The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW.