Hezbollah’s decision to grant confidence to Nawaf Salam’s government is not just a political maneuver. It is a moment of contradiction, recalibration, and an unspoken acknowledgment that Lebanon has changed. A week ago, Hezbollah supporters were in the streets, blocking roads, accusing Salam of being a Zionist, and rejecting any discussion of the group’s weapons. Today, that same party has backed a ministerial statement that omits “armed resistance” and affirms the state’s sole authority in defending Lebanon.
So, is this a turning point or another carefully managed illusion?
For years, Hezbollah has framed itself as Lebanon’s guarantor of security, dismissing any government or political figure who questioned its weapons. Its presence in the system was justified by the argument that the state was too weak to defend Lebanon. Now, by backing a government that defines the state as the sole protector, Hezbollah has effectively conceded that the political order it resisted for decades is now a reality it cannot fully control.
Does this mean Hezbollah is preparing for a transition, or is it simply a tactical retreat to preserve influence? The answer to that question does not lie in statements or rhetoric—it lies in what happens next.
The Three Hard Conversations Lebanon Must Have
The government’s vote of confidence is not just a test for Hezbollah; it is a test for Lebanon as a whole. While Hezbollah’s supporters struggle to reconcile their party’s stance with its past rhetoric, the country faces three difficult but necessary conversations.
1.The Government and Hezbollah: The Inevitable Disarmament Debate
Now that the ministerial statement affirms state authority over security, what happens when Israel completes its withdrawal? If the stated justification for Hezbollah’s arms is the occupation of Lebanese land, then what happens when that occupation ends? Does Hezbollah disarm? Does it integrate further into the state? Or does it create a new justification for maintaining its weapons?
The Lebanese government will have to test the credibility of Hezbollah’s own narrative. If resistance is tied to occupation, and occupation ends, the logical conclusion is that armed resistance also ends. But if Hezbollah refuses to disarm, it will need to construct a new rationale for its military existence, one that will inevitably come into conflict with the very government it just backed.
2.Hezbollah and Its Supporters: The Hardest Conversation of All
Hezbollah’s leadership may be shifting its approach, but what about its base? For decades, Hezbollah’s supporters were taught that the state is weak, that their weapons are sacred, and that anyone questioning the resistance is a traitor. Now, their own leadership has accepted a government that no longer validates these claims.
If Hezbollah is moving toward a different kind of role in Lebanon, how does it convince its supporters to move with it? Will its base accept a slow retreat from militarism, or will this create internal fractures? The greatest challenge Hezbollah faces may not come from external actors—it may come from within, from those unwilling to accept that the party must evolve.
3.Lebanon’s Reformists and the Future of the State
While Hezbollah and its supporters navigate their own contradictions, reformists, independents, and political parties outside the traditional sectarian structure have an equally important role to play.
The long-term conflict in Lebanon is not just about Hezbollah’s weapons—it is about what Lebanon itself is. Is it a resistance state? A neutral state? A country with permanent militias, or one where all groups fall under the authority of the government? For years, reformists have focused on economic and political reforms, avoiding the deeper existential question of Lebanon’s identity.
If Hezbollah’s confidence vote marks the beginning of a shift, then it is time for what was once the opposition to step forward and propose a new national framework—one that does not just criticize Hezbollah’s role, but offers a real alternative vision for the state. Otherwise, Hezbollah will shape the post-war order on its own terms, even as it changes.
This Is Not Just a Political Moment
While Salam’s government works to repair Lebanon’s economic collapse, stabilize institutions, and navigate international pressure, the country as a whole cannot ignore the deeper issues at stake. The ministerial statement may reflect a change in policy, but it cannot, on its own, reshape Lebanon’s political structure. That will require a national reckoning—a willingness to challenge old narratives, redefine priorities, and create a system where power is not dictated by who holds the most weapons.
The conversations Lebanon needs to have are not just about governance; they are about identity, legitimacy, and the kind of country Lebanon will be in the decades to come.
For the first time in years, Hezbollah has made a real political concession—even if it was a quiet one. The question is whether Lebanon is ready to hold them, and itself, accountable for what comes next.
Ramzi Abou Ismail is a political psychologist and researcher at the University of Kent.
The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW.
