A Government that reacts well, but is failing to lead
In the past few days, the Lebanese government has taken steps to reinforce military leadership and deploy troops to its borders; but not as part of a proactive security strategy. Instead, it has once again fallen into the same cycle of reacting to crises rather than preventing them. Whether on the Syrian or Israeli front, the state’s actions have been too little, too late, exposing the emptiness of its claims to sovereignty.
A border policy of reaction, not prevention
After months of ignoring escalating tensions, Lebanon finally sent troops to the Syrian border, but only after violence erupted, forcing the government’s hand. The deployment should have happened months ago, before armed groups in Lebanese territory launched missiles into Syria, before cross-border clashes became an inevitability, and before civilians were caught in yet another unnecessary escalation. The state claims to uphold sovereignty, but true sovereignty isn’t just about controlling borders; it’s about controlling what happens within them.
The Lebanese government, despite its ministerial statement affirming the state’s exclusive right to national defense, has done nothing to enforce it in practice. Worse, ministers within the same government have openly rejected setting a timeline for Hezbollah’s disarmament, citing continued occupation as justification. This contradiction exposes a deeper failure—not only does the government lack the will to assert full military authority over the country, but it is internally divided on what should happen next. A state that cannot agree on its own sovereignty is not just weak; it is paralyzed. And that is both dangerous and unsustainable.
Sovereignty cannot be selective
The Lebanese Army was met with hostility and hate speech in certain villages where Hezbollah enjoys strong support. Civilians—Lebanese citizens—accused the army of betrayal, not for taking action against them, but simply for asserting the presence of the state in areas long dominated by Hezbollah. This reaction exposes the deep fragmentation of Lebanon’s security landscape, where allegiance to an armed faction often supersedes loyalty to national institutions. How can a country claim sovereignty when its own people reject the authority of its army in favor of a militia? This is not just a failure of governance—it is the result of decades of state neglect, political cowardice, and an unwillingness to confront Lebanon’s entrenched factionalism. A country where the presence of its own army is viewed as a threat rather than a guarantor of security is not a sovereign state—it is a fractured one.
Sovereignty is not about empty rhetoric in ministerial statements or selective military deployments. It is about ensuring that no armed faction operates beyond the authority of the state—not on the Syrian border, not in the South, and not in the Bekaa or anywhere else in Lebanese territory. A government that only reacts to crises, rather than addressing the fundamental issues that cause them, is not a government asserting sovereignty—it is a government managing decline.
A government that must lead, not follow
If Lebanon’s leaders truly intend to reclaim sovereignty, they must take actions that go beyond last-minute military deployments. Enforcing the state’s monopoly on military decisions cannot remain an empty promise in official documents—it must become a reality. Setting a clear timeline for disarming Hezbollah and all non-state armed groups is no longer a political taboo but a necessity. The government must also shift from reactionary policies to proactive governance, preventing cross-border escalations before they happen instead of scrambling to respond once violence erupts. At the heart of this issue is trust in the national army—no Lebanese village should see it as an enemy, and no faction should believe that its security relies on anything other than the state itself. Sovereignty is not just about where troops are deployed; it is about who really governs the country. Right now, Lebanon’s government still does not have the answer to that question.
Ramzi Abou Ismail is a Political Psychologist and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at the Lebanese American University.
The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW
