Will Salam yield to the pressures of entrenched factions?
Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam faces significant hurdles in forming a government in Lebanon. One major challenge is the unreasonable demands from various political factions. These demands often conflict with the principles laid out by President Joseph Aoun, complicating the formation process1. Additionally, proposed names for key ministerial positions have sparked public objections on social media, forcing Salam to reconsider his choices. Many of Lebanon’s current leaders rose to power in time of war and chaos. It’s the environment where they thrived. If a new, technocratic government were brought in, the current sectarian parties wouldn’t just lose their political power but also their ability to skim profits off lucrative contracts. It would threaten the nepotism and patronage that underpins the party-led political system we so often call “sectarian”—a system fueled not by religious hatred but by the profits and corruption it facilitates.
Ah, the illustrious world of Lebanese ministers and their sectarian political settlement—a true masterpiece of modern governance. Picture this: a grand stage where the actors are not merely politicians but the very embodiment of their sects, each one meticulously chosen to represent their community’s interests. It’s like a never-ending soap opera, where the plot twists as predictable as the sunrise, yet somehow, we can’t look away. In other words we are witnessing a deja-vu a manifestation on how sectarian Economics is key to Ministerial Appointments
Maintaining the balance of eco-sectarian politics.
In this grand production, the Ministry of Finance is always played by a Shia Muslim, the Ministry of Interior by a Sunni Muslim, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by a Maronite Christian. It’s a casting director’s dream come true, ensuring that every sect gets its fair share of the spotlight. After all, who needs meritocracy when you have sectarian quotas to guide the way?
But wait, there’s more! The Ministry of Energy and Water, often headed by a Maronite Christian, is responsible for the country’s electricity and water supply. You’d think that with such a crucial role, we’d have a reliable power grid and clean water flowing through our taps. Alas, the reality is more akin to a comedy of errors, with frequent power cuts and water shortages. But hey, at least the sectarian balance is maintained, right? Then there’s the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, usually a conflict between all. This ministry oversees the development and maintenance of roads, ports, and airports. One might expect a well-connected and efficient transportation network, but instead, we have pothole-ridden roads and crumbling infrastructure. Yet, the sectarian allocation ensures that the so called community has its fair share of influence, so who are we to complain? The Ministry of Telecommunications, often assigned to a Sunni, controls the telecommunications sector, including mobile and internet services. In a world where digital connectivity is paramount, you’d think we’d have affordable and high-speed internet. Instead, we have exorbitant prices and limited competition. But fear not, for the sectarian balance is preserved, and that’s what truly matters. And let’s not forget the Ministry of Health, typically wanted by Shiites. With the responsibility of overseeing the country’s healthcare system, one would hope for accessible and quality medical services. Yet, the reality is a fragmented and underfunded system, where sectarian affiliations often determine the quality of care one receives. But hey, at least the sectarian quota is respected.
Public servants or??
In this grand sectarian political settlement, the ministers are not just public servants but the guardians of their sects’ interests. They wield their power not for the common good but to ensure that their communities receive their fair share of resources and influence. It’s a delicate balancing act, where the true art lies in maintaining the status quo while giving the illusion of progress. It is true that while the GDP composition by sector doesn’t explicitly detail sectarian repartition, however, the influence of sectarian quotas and political settlements likely plays a role in the distribution of economic power and resources within these sectors. This ensures that each sect has a stake in the country’s economic activities, maintaining the delicate balance of sectarian politics.
Lebanon’s bloated bureaucracy is not only too big—it’s ineffective. A 2005 World Bank study found in the health sector, Lebanon required 25 percent more funds to achieve the same health outcomes as best practices countries. The transport department has a budget of over $8 million a year, but it offers a fleet of just 40 buses and little other public transport. The national train service, which hasn’t functioned in decades, has hundreds of staff on payroll. Laying them off could be too sensitive.
The beauty of sectarian quotas in Lebanon—a system so finely tuned, it could be mistaken for a well-oiled machine of favoritism and cronyism. Picture this: a grand bazaar where political leaders hand out positions like candy at a carnival, all in the name of maintaining a delicate balance of power. It’s a delightful dance of patronage, clientelism, and nepotism, where the only rule is loyalty to the sectarian political party. The equation is as straightforward as it gets: “We get you or your cousin twice removed a cushy government job, and you pledge undying allegiance to our sectarian cause.” It’s a win-win situation, really. Who needs meritocracy when you have a network of well-connected relatives ready to step in and keep the wheels of sectarian politics turning?
In this whimsical world, ministers are not just public servants but the gatekeepers of their sect’s interests. They wield their power with the finesse of a maestro conducting an orchestra, ensuring that every note of patronage and nepotism is perfectly in tune. And the best part? The public gets to watch this spectacle unfold, knowing that their political and economic fate rests in the hands of a few well-placed family members.
Salam Dilemna
Forcibly Salam must navigate the unreasonable demands of political factions, manage public objections, and act decisively to form a competent and transparent government that can address Lebanon’s dire needs. Lebanon analysis of political life and government formation can be enriched by examining his concepts of governmentality and biopolitics. The idea of governmentality refers to the way in which the state exercises control over the population through a combination of administrative measures and the dissemination of knowledge. In Lebanon, this can be seen in how political leaders use historical narratives and collective memory to legitimize their authority and maintain power.
To understand the social and political economy of sectarianism in Lebanon, we must first examine the state’s economic structure—a so-called laissez-faire free market economy—alongside its constitutional framework of a corporate consociational democracy and its legal context, which includes 15 separate religious courts rather than a single judiciary operating under civil personal status law. Under this system, Lebanese nationals do not function as “citizens” in the conventional sense. Instead, they are members of religious “communities” through which they must navigate to access their political and social rights. Consequently, significant aspects of their social lives, such as marriage, divorce, custody, birth, death, and inheritance, are governed by religious courts. Similarly, most avenues to political representation are inherently tied to one’s sectarian identity due to the sectarian quota system.
Lebanon’s consociational system is predicated on the notion that society is “deeply divided” along sectarian lines. Personal matters are relegated to religious courts, and political power is meticulously divided among representative leaders from each sect to mitigate conflict. This system traps Lebanese nationals in a framework where their very existence in the modern nation-state is dictated by their sectarian affiliation, with political representation and access to state resources dependent on their sectarian leaders or “patrons.” From this starting point, the dynamics of sectarianism become clearer.
Lebanon political economy of sectarianism is one where a small politically connected elite appropriates the bulk of economic surplus and redistributes it through communal clientelism. Essentially, the essence of sectarianism lies in a system of non-state (or para-state) welfare and security, known as clientelism. Political leaders and economic elites, despite their public condemnations of sectarianism, have a vested interest in deploying sectarian tactics to sustain the current system and maintain their dominance.
It is important to understand that people do not follow sectarian leaders blindly; rather, they follow their perceived interests closely. Sectarianism has its logic and mechanisms “from below.” In contrast to explanations of sectarianism as identity-based politics, it is better understood as interests-based politics. While the ruling class uses sectarianism as a control tool, the working classes abide by sectarian rules to access welfare and protection or to avoid sanctions. In this sense, sectarianism masks and often co-opts class politics, trapping the working classes in what Laurent Berlant called “cruel optimism.” This system of positive and negative sanctioning enables sectarianism to reproduce itself and co-opt most attempts to organize along class lines from below. The current sectarian system acts as the guardian of elite class interests, employing divide-and-rule tactics whenever the status quo is threatened or when there is a potential for class-based organization.
Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, which focuses on the regulation of populations through an array of political and administrative mechanisms, is also relevant to Lebanon’s political landscape. Lebanese politicians often invoke the heroism of their sects during the civil war to create a sense of unity and loyalty among their followers, thereby exerting control over the population.
Control over communities
This dynamic is clearly reflected in the composition and functioning of the Council of Ministers in Lebanon. Can Salam evade the fact that the council is formed based on sectarian quotas, with each ministry being allocated to a specific sect? This allocation reinforces sectarian influence and ensures that political leaders maintain control over their respective communities. For example, the Ministry of Finance is traditionally held by a Shia Muslim, the Ministry of Interior by a Sunni Muslim, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by a Maronite Christian. This sectarian distribution of ministries perpetuates the power dynamics and control mechanisms described by Foucault. The Council of Ministers in Lebanon is often formed based on sectarian quotas, with each ministry being allocated to a specific sect. This practice is deeply rooted in the country’s political system, which is designed to ensure representation and balance among the various religious and sectarian groups. However, this approach also perpetuates sectarian divisions and influences the functioning of the government.
Each ministry is typically assigned to a specific sect, reinforcing the power dynamics and control mechanisms described by Foucault. The repartition of ministries among sects in Lebanon is often viewed as a reflection of the broader economic sectors being divided among these sects. This allocation not only serves political purposes but also ensures that each sect controls significant economic resources and influence.
The sectarian allocation of ministries extends beyond mere political representation. It also translates into economic power and control over key sectors, enabling each sect to secure its economic interests and maintain its influence. This division of economic resources can lead to inefficiencies and conflicts within the government, as each sect prioritizes its own interests over national development goals.
By examining this dynamic through Michel Foucault’s lens of power/knowledge, we can better understand how the sectarian allocation of ministries in Lebanon perpetuates existing power structures and influences the country’s economic landscape. This analysis highlights the need for a more inclusive and cohesive approach to governance that transcends sectarian divisions and promotes equitable development for all.
The eco-sectarian allocation of ministries
The Ministry of Finance’s Shia Muslim authoritative rule gives considerable power over the country’s budget, taxation, and public expenditure. By controlling the Ministry of Finance, the Shia sect gains significant leverage over financial policies and resource allocation, impacting various economic sectors such as banking, investment, and public services.
Maronite Christian influence over Energy and Oil extends to the management of state-owned enterprises and infrastructure projects, which are vital to the country’s economic development. Controlling this ministry allows the Maronite community to have a significant say in energy policies and infrastructure investments, impacting economic growth and stability.
The Ministry of Public Works and Transport control over transportation networks and infrastructure projects enables the Sunni sect to influence economic activities related to trade, logistics, and tourism.
The Ministry of Telecommunications control over the rapidly growing digital economy allows the Sunni community to influence technology adoption, digital innovation, and communication infrastructure development, which are critical for economic progress.
This sectarian allocation of ministries can lead to inefficiencies and conflicts within the government. Ministers may be more focused on serving their sectarian constituencies rather than working collaboratively for the common good. This often resulted in a lack of cohesive policy-making and hinder the government’s ability to address national issues effectively.
Where do we go from here
The prolonged delay in forming the cabinet, which sends a negative message to the Lebanese public and emboldens corrupt politicians who prioritize their interests over national recovery. This delay undermines President Aoun’s roadmap for political accountability, economic reforms, and addressing the humanitarian crisis. Salam’s tenure as PM-designate is a crucial test of leadership. By yielding to the pressures of entrenched political factions, he risks losing public confidence and reinforcing a system plagued by inefficiency and corruption. The Lebanese people, who have taken to the streets demanding change, expect decisive leadership and a break from the status quo.
Moreover, the sectarian nature of the government can make it difficult to implement reforms. Political leaders may resist changes that could weaken their sectarian power base, leading to a stagnation of the political system. This can also contribute to a culture of patronage and clientelism, where political leaders use their positions to distribute resources and favors to their sectarian supporters.
By applying Foucault’s analysis, we can better understand how Lebanese political forces use knowledge and historical narratives to shape public perception and maintain their power. This approach highlights the intricate relationship between power, knowledge, and the governance of populations in Lebanon, particularly through the sectarian allocation of ministries and the influence it exerts on the political landscape. So, here’s to the ministers of Lebanon, the true maestros of sectarian politics. They navigate the treacherous waters of governance with the finesse of a tightrope walker, ensuring that the sectarian balance is never disrupted. And while the country may suffer from inefficiencies, corruption, and stagnation, we can all take comfort in knowing that the sectarian quotas are upheld. Bravo, ministers, bravo!
Maan Barazy is an economist and founder and president of the National Council of Entrepreneurship and Innovation. He tweets @maanbarazy
The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW