HomeOpinionColumnsLebanon’s next government is a test not a victory

Lebanon’s next government is a test not a victory


Lebanon's Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam meets with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun at Baabda Palace in Beirut, Lebanon on February 5, 2025, as part of efforts to form a new government. Lebanese Presidency / Anadolu (Photo by Lebanese Presidency / ANADOLU / Anadolu via AFP)

Lebanon still does not have a government, but the negotiations surrounding its formation tell us everything we need to know about the challenges ahead

Nawaf Salam’s appointment was a moment of hope – a rare chance to see a prime minister with integrity attempt to navigate Lebanon’s broken political system. But hope alone does not build a government, nor does it break the entrenched interests that have suffocated Lebanon for decades.

As talks drag on, the public is growing increasingly skeptical, despite Salam’s three attempts to ensure the public their interests is what is guiding his efforts. Instead of being treated as a break from the past, the formation process is beginning to look all too familiar – sectarian bargaining, last-minute deals, and political parties maneuvering to protect their interests. This government was supposed to represent something new, yet it is being built through the same backroom negotiations that defined its predecessors.

This is not about rejecting the government altogether. It is about recognizing that the Lebanese people deserve more than just a cabinet; they deserve accountability. If we do not demand it now, we never will.

 

The formation process: a blundered opportunity

First, Salam made a critical mistake: he failed to control the narrative.

The Lebanese people have not heard from their Prime Minister-designate in a meaningful way since his appointment. Instead of defining his own government, he has let others define it for him. Political factions, media leaks, and speculation have filled the void he left. The result? A growing perception that this is just another government being shaped by the same old forces.

For weeks, Salam allowed others to control the public perception of his government. By the time he stepped forward, it was too late – the damage was already done. He must now undo that damage.

 

Is this really a break from the past?

For those expecting this government to be a turning point, I ask: what exactly has changed?

Have entrenched parties lost influence? No, they are still securing their shares.

Has the formation process been transparent? No, it has been driven by closed-door negotiations.

Has Nawaf Salam set a clear, transformative agenda? Not yet.

Again, this is not about rejecting the government altogether. It is about demanding that it actually delivers on the expectations it raised. If we do not insist on accountability now, we never will.

 

The real test begins now

So what happens next, assuming what we have heard – not from the Prime Minister-designate himself, but through leaks and speculation – is true? If the cabinet is indeed in its final stages, and if it emerges as reported, we may see Yassine Jaber as Minister of Finance, a Minister of Foreign Affairs named by the Lebanese Forces, and all major political factions walking away with more or less what they demanded – but all within the conditions set by Salam. The question remains: will this government push forward with genuine reforms, or will it be yet another attempt at managing Lebanon’s collapse rather than reversing it? Will it secure the necessary funding from the IMF, or will it be derailed by the same forces that have sabotaged every past attempt at economic recovery? Most importantly, will this government have the political coherence and institutional strength to outlast the entrenched political forces that are waiting for the first opportunity to render it ineffective?

For now, this government remains a question mark. Nawaf Salam may be the right man for the job, but his approach to government formation carries serious risks. His decision to keep negotiations behind closed doors rather than engaging the public, his failure to build a strong team of strategists and experts to help him navigate Lebanon’s political minefield, and his singular focus on overcoming Shia obstruction without simultaneously forging alliances with those who could have strengthened his position are all calculated choices – but will they prove to be the right ones? If these decisions ultimately serve his strategy and he manages to govern effectively, then history may prove him right. But if they lead to stagnation, obstruction, and a government that lacks the necessary momentum to succeed, then Salam will become just another name in Lebanon’s long list of disappointments.

As said before, Lebanon does not need a government on paper – it needs a government that works. The choices made in the coming days will determine whether this is a new opportunity for reform or just another reshuffling of the same broken system.

 

Ramzi Abou Ismail is a  political psychologist and researcher at the University of Kent.

The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW.