The issue focuses on the complexities and dangers of the maritime border demarcation file with Cyprus, given the legal, political, and even military dispute between Turkey and Cyprus over the Cypriot blocks adjacent to the Lebanese blocks. Lebanon finds itself in a political dilemma, caught between Cypriot insistence—supported by France and Europe—on completing the demarcation, and Turkish opposition to it.
Lebanon’s maritime boundary dispute and the ensuing negotiations to delimit such a boundary with its maritime neighbors are not unique. Instead, these disputes are placed in the context of the region’s larger and more complicated nature. Furthermore, Lebanon’s relationship with its neighbors has economic repercussions, namely regarding a potential gas bonanza should any of the parties successfully develop their offshore exploration activities. With the maritime boundaries remaining undelimited, some of Lebanon’s neighbors are already exploring and/or expected to stringently claim prospective maritime hydrocarbons that should fall on the Lebanese side, as well as lease out blocks extending into Lebanon. The latter’s calls urging the former’s governments and the concerned oil companies to halt their activities that implicate Lebanon have never been answered.
Lebanon’s maritime boundary delimitation dispute with its neighbors is a complex operation that necessitates tracing back the legal principles followed by both Lebanon and Israel; Cyprus, however, has its own legal principles that it adopted with Egypt and Israel. It is envisaged that Lebanon shall delineate its maritime boundary with both of its reluctant neighbors by resorting to such established rules. U.S. special envoy Morgan Ortagus has reportedly has reportedly raised the issue of demarcation and direct talks with Israel. NOWLEBANON has not been able to confirm the news independently.
Potential gas fields and the regional pipeline network.
According to Yasser Helal Publisher and editor in chief of the authoritative publication “Taqamena”, the necessity of establishing a National Demarcation Authority that includes all relevant government entities and is affiliated with the Presidency of the Republic. The task of maritime border demarcation and map creation would be assigned exclusively to the Lebanese Army. Meanwhile, governmental and constitutional bodies would handle negotiations and decisions regarding concessions or adherence to the drawn line, ensuring the army is not burdened with political responsibility in this matter. Hilal told NOWLEBANON there is a primary focus on reactivating the Petroleum Sector Management Authority. This reactivation is anticipated to be part of the broader expected reform process. Despite its significant achievements, this authority has been marginalized, primarily due to its subordination to energy ministers, reducing it to a mere advisory body.
The challenges and responsibilities that senior officials—not just the Energy and Oil Minister—are avoiding, pose a serious risk to Lebanon’s nascent oil and gas wealth, Hilal says. One of the most pressing issues lies in the demarcation of maritime borders with Cyprus and Syria, which represents a geopolitical conundrum no less complex than the one faced during the demarcation with Israel. While the border agreement with Israel was achieved during a rare alignment of overlapping factors and circumstances, described by Minister Yassine Jaber as a “planetary alignment,” the demarcation with Syria and Cyprus requires an even more orderly and prolonged alignment, adding two new “planets”—Russia and Turkey—to the mix, he added.
The border demarcation with Israel benefited from a moment of “planetary alignment,” whereas the process with Cyprus and Syria demands a new alignment that includes the “planets” of Turkey and Russia, he noticed.
When it comes to Cyprus, the situation is particularly intricate. In fact, it may be far more challenging than the negotiations with Israel. This is due to its ties to the Cyprus issue and the division of the island into two parts or states. Consequently, the core of the problem shifts from Cyprus alone to also involve Turkey, adding another layer of complexity to the negotiations.
No exploration before demarcation
There is countless evidence of companies avoiding operations in countries with unresolved border disputes or lacking proper facilities for export, a research in “Taqamena” says. The only consortium that “ventured” into the first licensing round in Lebanon withdrew from Blocks 4 and 9 after years of procrastination in fulfilling its commitments. Even the drilling process in these blocks was more of a “disclaimer” to meet the minimum contractual obligations, safeguarding the credibility of the three companies (Total Energies, Eni, and Qatar Energy). It was announced that no gas was found even before completing the drilling. Attempts to attract any companies have failed, including the “maneuver” of not extending the second licensing round and initiating a third licensing round. Also an unspoken issue is that the northern blocks are disputed with Syria, the western blocks are contested first with Cyprus and later with Turkey, while the southern blocks’ fate hinges on the outcome of the conflict with Israel and regional settlements, the document highlights.
Moreover, Israel could not convince oil companies to develop its central fields, including its largest field, Leviathan, until agreements were made to export gas to Jordan, the first of which was in 2014, alongside agreements to export gas to Egypt for liquefaction and re-export or local consumption. Although Egypt is the only country in the region with massive export facilities, including two gas liquefaction plants and pipelines, actual discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean only began after finalizing border agreements with Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.
The same scenario has played out in Cyprus since 2011, when the Aphrodite field was announced as one of the largest in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet successive Cypriot governments continue to ignore the dual problem of their sharp border conflict with Turkey and the lack of export facilities, compounded by a limited local market, according to the same source.
The issue focuses on the complexities and dangers of the maritime border demarcation file with Cyprus, given the legal, political, and even military dispute between Turkey and Cyprus over the Cypriot blocks adjacent to the Lebanese blocks. Lebanon finds itself in a political dilemma, caught between Cypriot insistence—supported by France and Europe—on completing the demarcation, and Turkish opposition to it.
Maritime borders under dispute
Lebanon’s maritime borders are arguably the most disputed in the Eastern Mediterranean, with boundaries shared with its southern neighbor Israel and its western neighbor Cyprus. Lebanese-Israeli tension and intricate relations mark the history of the two states. The Lebanese coastline, around 225 kilometers long, stretches from the northern Wadi Khaled, where it meets Syria, to the southern Ras al-Naqura, where borders with Israel and the Mediterranean intersect. A large part of the coastline is made up of narrow beaches, rocky cliffs and caves that have played a role in engaging in clandestine maritime activities.
The hydrocarbon rift structure becomes less probable in the triangle offshore from the city of Tripoli, because the bathymetry, with deep waters, does not fit with the structural models developed on the seismic lines surveyed in this area. On the other hand, in the eastern area, dominantly muddy as far as the Lebanese maritime boundary claims, the sedimentation is partly recent and may not have policed the paleogeographic paleo valley that could localize the hydrocarbons in the Lebanese economic zone. Before the exploratory drilling of wells in the Lebanese Economic Zone, the adequacy of water sedimentation for the localization of typical hydrocarbon reservoirs can only be studied through geophysical surveys, to understand the type of sedimentation in the monocline edges.
The urgency of the demarcation
The maritime border demarcation file has become increasingly urgent as Turkey’s unexpectedly swift move to open negotiations for maritime border demarcation with Syria; Hilal highlighted. This development is anticipated to cause significant upheaval in maritime boundary disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish-Greek conflicts, he added.
Turkey’s initiative to finalize maritime borders with Syria constitutes a crucial element in its strategy of accumulating leverage for future negotiations and settlements, he said. This adds to Turkey’s prior agreement with Libya, where the controversial memorandum of understanding signed in 2019 became an international agreement after being deposited with the United Nations, despite its legal weaknesses and the validity of objections raised against it. However, Turkey’s ultimate “grand prize” in its negotiation strategy remains securing Egypt’s agreement on their maritime boundary demarcation, a matter Turkey considers a priority in the normalization of relations with Egypt, he quoted.
It is noteworthy that Turkey’s move to address maritime borders with Syria coincides with its largest naval military exercise from January 7 to 16, named “Blue Homeland 2025.” The “Blue Homeland” concept, introduced by Turkish nationalists in 2006 and officially adopted by the Justice and Development Party in March 2019, has since been a cornerstone of Turkey’s foreign and defense policies. The concept aims to expand Turkey’s maritime territory from approximately 40,000 square kilometers currently to over 462,000 square kilometers.
Cyprus is expected to take countermeasures, including completing its maritime border demarcation with Lebanon to complement existing agreements with Israel and Egypt, Hilal believes. Sources familiar with the matter have informed “TAQA MENA” magazine that Cyprus, with direct support from France and Greece, will soon initiate efforts to revive the maritime border demarcation file with Lebanon. The goal is to finalize and ratify the agreement signed between the two countries in 2007 after necessary amendments are made.
According to Hilal Although the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is only recognized by Turkey, the situation in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is marked by significant legal, geopolitical, and potentially military complexities. The blocks adjacent to Lebanon’s borders are at the center of a dispute involving Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and what Turkey refers to as “Greek Cyprus.” This conflict arises within the broader context of Turkey’s long-standing efforts to reclaim what it considers its rightful share of the Mediterranean—waters it believes it was deprived of nearly a century ago under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which granted Greece control over the Aegean islands.
Lebanon has valid reasons to claim an EEZ as designated, because its land border with Israel, the point of which lies on its southeastern land limit, is one of the few borders in the world to occupy a 1:1 ratio with the claimed EEZ’s maritime projection. The same argument applies for the demarcation of territorial airspace at the high seas limit, which should also occur at the same accessible limit of prolongment of the land border.
To add to the intricate problematic is the fact that the longest distance separating the Lebanese coast from Cyprus is 90 nautical miles in the vicinity of the Ras Nakura/Pont de Gêne area. This distance shrinks to 40 nautical miles south of Ras Nakura/Pont de Gêne. This implies that the proposed Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends rather far north over a section of the Cypriot EEZ, blocking access between the northern and southern portions of the latter, and conflicting with some of the maritime areas delineated by Cyprus. This conclusion is warranted in the light of the width of the supposed Lebanese EEZ, as well as the fact that Cyprus is not only the easternmost island in the Mediterranean, but also the very first island one encounters when sailing from the Lebanese coast en route to Egypt. Cyprus’ eastern boundary runs from the island along a southwesterly direction toward the Nile Delta in order to connect it with the Egyptian EEZ, in which an extension is defined westward toward the Ionian Sea.
Turkey’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean
Relations between Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean have followed a historical process full of ups and downs, which were driven either by problems arising in the region or their deterioration. However, at the turn of the 20th century, it was possible to observe a new momentum in these relations. An important factor is the discovery of natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, which forced Ankara to ameliorate its contact level with all parties in the region, including Lebanon. This impetus was again based on a political basis, as Turkey, like other states, wanted to predict the energy policies of the Eastern Mediterranean states.
Cyprus and the Maritime Disputes
Cyprus has always played a significant role in the Eastern Mediterranean, and this function is constantly growing. Due to its geographical position, Cyprus has regular and political ties with all the littoral states of the Eastern Mediterranean, namely Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Israel. Cyprus also forms a bridge not only between Europe and the Middle East but in some aspects between Europe and the Asian and African economic markets.
In recent years Cyprus has developed close commercial relations with Lebanon, Syria and Israel. The proximity of Egypt and Turkey, its former most important partners, and the political turmoil in Lebanon and Iraq, has compelled Cyprus to develop relations with the latter two countries and especially to foster their economic connection.
This larger role that Cyprus has assumed in the Eastern Mediterranean is based in part upon commercial interests, which, in the light of the energy resources found in the area, are multiplying and creating a strong motive for establishing its own free economic zone in the region, in close cooperation with Lebanon, Syria and Israel, and in part upon its intention to assume a more active role in relation to events, so that it will not always be merely an observer, but will take part in a process which could lead to a comprehensive peace and stability in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region.
Oil and Gas Reserves
The natural gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean are considered valuable for the energy future of Israel and other neighboring countries. The potential reserves in the offshore Levant Basin are estimated to be about 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas.
Oil and gas production contributes a sizeable percentage of GDPs in the Eastern Mediterranean countries of Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon and Libya. For other neighboring coastal countries like Syria and Tunisia, hydrocarbons represent between 20 to 30 percent of GDP. It is therefore not surprising that access to hydrocarbons has increasingly come to form the basis for national budgets and, in some instances, the ability to bring about economic recovery.
Future Prospects for Resolution
Lebanon faces two bitter choices in its maritime border demarcation efforts, a reality well-known to senior Lebanese officials yet often ignored.
According to Hilal, Lebanon could proceed with signing a border demarcation agreement with the Republic of Cyprus, risking antagonizing Turkey. This option would carry serious domestic political and sectarian ramifications, alongside even graver consequences for regional alliances and Turkey’s central role, Hilal believes
Yet to be seen whereas another possible future scenario is Lebanese-Israeli rapprochement in the framework of wider regional normalization, changes in Lebanon hence providing the political space for a broader recognition of Israel. Are such changes on the horizon?
Maan Barazy is an economist and founder and president of the National Council of Entrepreneurship and Innovation. He tweets @maanbarazy
The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW
