In recent days, the idea of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel has resurfaced in diplomatic conversations and media reports. For some, this signals a potential diplomatic breakthrough. For others, it represents a long-overdue attempt to move beyond the cycle of escalation that has defined the Lebanese-Israeli frontier for decades.
Yet beneath the headlines and diplomatic optimism lies a far more complicated reality. When examined through the lens of power, enforcement, and institutional capacity, the current discussion about negotiations appears less like the beginning of a meaningful process and more like a conversation detached from the structural realities that produced the conflict in the first place.
Two fundamental problems stand at the center of this debate.
France Cannot End This War Without the United States
Much of the diplomatic momentum surrounding potential negotiations appears to be coming from European initiatives, particularly from France. Historically, France has maintained deep political and cultural ties with Lebanon and has often positioned itself as a mediator in Lebanese crises. This role gives Paris a degree of diplomatic access that other international actors may not possess.
But access and influence are not the same thing.
Ending a conflict between Lebanon and Israel requires leverage in three critical domains: military, diplomatic, and strategic. In all three areas, the decisive actor remains the United States.
Washington holds the primary strategic relationship with Israel, including military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the provision of advanced weapons systems. It also provides Israel with diplomatic protection in international institutions, particularly within the UN Security Council. Perhaps most importantly, the United States is the only actor capable of coordinating the broader regional dynamics that influence Israeli strategic calculations.
France can propose frameworks, host discussions, and serve as a diplomatic intermediary acceptable to Lebanese political actors. But it does not possess the tools necessary to compel Israel to accept a settlement or to guarantee that any agreement would actually be implemented.
In practice, this means that any diplomatic initiative not anchored in a clear US-led strategy is unlikely to move beyond the level of symbolic diplomacy.
This is not a criticism of French diplomacy as much as it is a recognition of the hierarchy of power in the international system. France can help shape a proposal. But only Washington can transform that proposal into a settlement capable of altering realities on the ground.
The Real Problem Is Enforcement, Not Negotiation
The second problem is even more fundamental, and it lies inside Lebanon itself.
Calls for negotiations often assume that the central obstacle to stability is the absence of formal agreements. But Lebanon already operates under international commitments that explicitly require the disarmament of non-state militias, including Hezbollah.
These commitments are not theoretical. They have existed for years and are embedded in internationally recognized frameworks that were meant to stabilize the Lebanese-Israeli frontier.
Yet the existence of these clauses has never translated into implementation.
This reveals the true nature of the problem. The obstacle is not the absence of diplomatic language calling for disarmament. The obstacle is the state’s ability to enforce such commitments.
Hezbollah is not only an armed group operating outside the Lebanese political system. It is deeply embedded within that system. It maintains its own military structure while simultaneously participating in parliamentary politics and government coalitions. At the same time, it forms part of a wider regional deterrence architecture tied to Iran’s strategic posture in the Middle East.
Under these conditions, the Lebanese state has historically lacked both the political consensus and the coercive capacity required to impose disarmament.
This is precisely why previous agreements have failed to produce the outcomes they formally demanded.
Why Would a New Agreement Be Any Different?
Once this reality is acknowledged, the central question becomes unavoidable.
If Lebanon has already signed agreements requiring militia disarmament, and if those agreements were never implemented, why would a new agreement succeed where the previous ones failed?
For a new settlement to produce different results, one of several structural conditions would need to change.
The first would be a decisive shift in the balance of military power, altering the cost-benefit calculations of the actors involved. The second would be a fundamental political realignment within Lebanon that produces both the consensus and the capacity to enforce state authority. The third would be a strategic recalibration by Hezbollah’s external patrons, particularly Iran, altering the role the organization plays within the regional deterrence framework.
Absent such shifts, the addition of new diplomatic language does little to alter the underlying dynamics.
International agreements are effective only when the actors involved either possess the capacity to enforce them or the incentives to comply with them. Without one of these conditions, agreements tend to remain political documents rather than instruments of change.
Negotiations Without Structural Change
For this reason, the current conversation surrounding direct negotiations risks becoming detached from the realities that shape the conflict.
Diplomacy can play an important role in de-escalation, particularly when it accompanies real shifts in power or incentives. But when the underlying structural constraints remain unchanged, negotiations often become performative exercises, designed to signal progress rather than produce it.
In the present circumstances, the discussion of direct negotiations appears to fall into this category.
France does not possess the leverage required to impose or guarantee a settlement. Lebanon already operates under agreements calling for militia disarmament. And the core obstacle remains the same as it has been for years: the gap between legal commitments and the state’s ability to enforce them.
Until that gap is addressed, the idea that new negotiations will produce fundamentally different results remains difficult to sustain.
For now, the conversation may generate headlines and diplomatic activity. But without a shift in the underlying balance of power, it is unlikely to produce the kind of meaningful change that the moment demands.
Ramzi Abou Ismail is a Political Psychologist and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at the Lebanese American University.
The views in this story reflect those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of NOW.
